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Introduction
On April 24, 2016, David Sanger of The New York Times reported that the 
United States military had recently launched cyber-attacks against the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in an effort to broaden the methods of warfare 
aimed at toppling the regime.1 The article outlines how until recently, U.S. 
Cyber Command, the military’s cyber operations command, has yet to aim the 
technological weapons that have been traditionally used against nations such 
as Iran, North Korea, and Russia at ISIS.2 Cyber Command plans to initiate 
this “new line of combat against” the terrorist organization alongside traditional 
military efforts that are being executed.3 Specifically, the cyber-attacks will aim 
to “disrupt the ability of the Islamic State to spread its message, attract new 
adherents, circulate orders from commanders and carry out day-to-day functions, 
1 David E. Sanger, “U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat,” The New 
York Times, April 24, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directs-cy-
berweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html?_r=0.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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like paying its fighters.”4 Furthermore, through the acknowledgement of these 
tactics the U.S. military hopes to inflict psychological paranoia within ISIS 
as its leaders notice their plans, operations, and organization succumbing to 
technological sabotage.5 The article notes that launching cyber weapons must 
be done with caution, but the time to open up a new front in the war against 
ISIS has begun to override those initial concerns.
The United States’ decision to announce the use of such tactics against 
a foreign enemy represents a changing tide in warfare doctrine. Previously, 
all U.S. cyber operations were classified and the nation had never publicly 
announced the use of such weapons.6 Thus, Sanger’s article represents a shift 
in transparency regarding new domains of warfare. Perhaps more important-
ly, the article highlights that the U.S. does, in fact, use cyber weapons for 
offensive purposes. There have been suspicions in the past regarding cyber 
operations that could have potentially been carried out by the U.S. govern-
ment. However strong the evidence may be, the U.S. has never admitted to 
such a tactic; until now. To put the scope of the U.S. cyber platform into 
perspective, the American populace generally believes that most agencies and 
programs operate on a purely defensive level. 7 Nonetheless, because the cyber 
security infrastructure in the U.S. is so expansive, many think otherwise: that 
operations go beyond simple defensive measures. The Sanger article chronicles 
a shift in United States cyber warfare as its use slowly begins to emerge from 
the shadows and into the light.
The layman’s view sees cyber operations as purely defensive and in the inter-
est of the protection of the country. In a recent poll by Gallup, 73 percent of 
Americans saw the presence of cyber activities as a critical threat to U.S. national 
security.8 This highlights that a majority of Americans believe the nation is 
vulnerable to attack by cyber operations from other nations and organizations. 
Furthermore, this lends to the idea that the U.S. assumes a defensive position 
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 U.S. Government. The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. 2009. Defense 
Technical Information Center.
8 “Americans Cite Cyberterrorism Among Top Three Threats to U.S.,” Gallup, 
February 10, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/189161/americans-cite-cyberterror-
ism-among-top-three-threats.aspx.
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in the field of cyber warfare and only acts in response to an aggressor’s attack. 
In another poll taken by the Pew Research Center, 61 percent of respondents 
believed that a serious cyber-attack would cripple the society and infrastructure 
of a nation in the near future.9 This poll serves to underline the consensus of 
alarm amongst the population that cyber warfare is an imminent threat and the 
U.S., among other nations, must take the necessary steps in order to protect 
itself. In general, both polls characterize the conventional wisdom behind cyber 
warfare: that the possibility of an attack is likely and the U.S. must pursue 
precautionary, defensive measures in order to ensure the security of the country.
Although the United States has developed a defensive cyber arsenal since the 
events of 9/11, this perspective is incomplete. There are, indeed, cyber pro-
grams that have been developed in the interest of national security and defense. 
However, this viewpoint does not capture the entire story. The United States has 
eclipsed defensive cyber strategies and developed and implemented offensive 
cyber operations aimed at sabotaging the infrastructure of groups and nations 
across the globe. The U.S. fleet of cyber programs has drastically expanded since 
the terrorist acts on September 11, 2001.10 The U.S. has embarked down a path 
of aggressive cyber warfare that has slipped beneath the public’s perception and 
been misunderstood for national security purposes.
The United States military’s decision to pursue a path of offensive cyber 
warfare in the conflict against ISIS raises numerous questions and concerns. 
The implications of such an action range from ethical issues associated with 
privacy rights and technological sabotage to the further concentration of global 
political power in the U.S.’s hands. The act of launching an offensive cyber 
weapon opens the floodgates to an entirely new form of warfare. While still 
in its infancy, the potential strength of cyber operations is just beginning to 
be discovered and the U.S.’s decision to meddle in the structural and logistical 
arms of an enemy opens the door to unknown side effects. Not only does 
this decision alter the methods and direction of combat, but it also creates 
9 “Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase,” Pew Research Center, October 29, 2014, http://www.
pewinternet.org/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-likely-to-increase/.
10 Barton Gellman and Greg Miller, “Black Budget Summary Details U.S. Spy Network’s 
Successes, Failures and Objectives,” The Washington Post, August 29, 2013, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-
successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.
html?utm_term=.31dd5c03d15e.
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potentially dangerous situations if this malicious data gets in the hands of 
the wrong people. For example, once a malicious code is created it remains 
in the domain of the World Wide Web and can be reused by whoever finds 
it to commit sabotage or espionage.11
The decision by the U.S. to conduct such operations highlights the military 
and technological strength of the country. The power of offensive cyber oper-
ations must not be overlooked and the potential for them to fall in the hands 
of the wrong people raises considerable alarm. No longer can these methods 
of warfare solely be considered defensive mechanisms for security. To better 
understand the scope and extent of the U.S.’s cyber warfare program, the fol-
lowing research question will be asked: How have United States cyber operations 
abroad evolved in the years following September 11, 2001?
Operation Olympic Games
Operation Olympic Games was an operation initiated by President George 
W. Bush and later carried out by President Obama aimed towards crippling 
Iran’s nuclear capabilities.12 The primary component within the program was a 
malicious virus, later named Stuxnet, which successfully infiltrated the Iranian 
nuclear facility at Natanz in 2010.13 Alongside Stuxnet were malicious pro-
grams, Flame and Duqu, that are thought to have contributed to the overall 
operation.14 The combination of Stuxnet, Flame, and Duqu made up the overall 
cyber strategy of Operation Olympic Games.
Between January and June of 2010, Iranian officials at the Natanz nuclear 
facility reported an unprecedented amount of failures among their centri-
fuges.15 United States intelligence officials had discovered that scientists were 
11  Rachel King, “Stuxnet Infected Chevron’s IT Network,” The Wall Street Journal, 
November 8, 2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2012/11/08/stuxnet-infected-chevrons-it-network/.
12 Cyber Conflict Studies Association, “The History of Stuxnet: Key Takeaways for Cyber 
Decision Makers,” AFCEA, June 4, 2012.
13 David E. Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran,” The 
New York Times, June 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-
ordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html.
14 Ellen Nakashima, “Iran acknowledges that Flame virus has infected computers nation-
wide,” The Washington Post, May 29, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nation-
al-security/iran-acknowledges-that-flame-virus-has-infected-computers-nationwide/2012/05/29/
gJQAzlEF0U_story.html?utm_term=.918c047822e0.
15 Ari Shapiro, “Documentary Explores The Cyber-War Secrets of Stuxnet,” NPR: 
All Things Considered, July 4, 2016, http://www.npr.org/2016/07/04/484713086/
documentary-explores-the-cyber-war-secrets-of-stuxnet.
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being fired at the nuclear facility due to industrial miscalculations.16 On 
June 17, 2010, Iranian officials contacted an outside cyber security firm to 
investigate a series of peculiar crashes their computers were experiencing.17 
The security firm, VirusBlokAda, based in Belarus, analyzed the computer 
malfunctions and identified the culprit as a large sequence of malicious 
code.18 The company then contacted Microsoft – the creator of the interface 
by which the malware operated. Microsoft security experts began to file 
through the unusually large 1 megabyte of binary code, finding trailblazing 
complexities within the software. Soon thereafter, the connection between 
the malware identified on the servers and the industrial failures at the Natanz 
nuclear facility was made. Stuxnet, the world’s most dangerous and sophis-
ticated cyber weapon, had been discovered. The virus that had caused the 
malfunctions of the centrifuges was found within the computer network 
at Natanz.19 The first ever cyber weapon had been successfully utilized to 
physically sabotage a target. 
The original version of Stuxnet, which operated prior to 2010, was designed 
to block the release of pressure within the centrifuges.20 Subsequently, this 
alteration in pressure would sabotage the nuclear enrichment process. This 
initial design of Stuxnet was intended to spread manually via USB stick and 
lacked the later qualities of self-replication.21 However, after some time, 
officials at the nuclear facility “did change several important configuration 
details such as the number of centrifuges and enrichment stages per cas-
cade.”22 These alterations in the enrichment process subsequently rendered 
the overpressure attack void. Additionally, the tactic of over pressurizing 
centrifuges led to some concern that the result could be catastrophic. Hence, 
the creators of the code abandoned the pressure attack and went to work on 
a new and improved code. 
16 Ibid.
17 Op. Cit., fn. 13.
18 Kim Zetter, “An Unprecedented Look At Stuxnet, The World’s First Digital Weapon,” 
Wired, November 3, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/.
19 Op. Cit., fn. 18
20 Ralph Langner, “To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet’s Creators 
Tried to Achieve,” The Langner Group, November 2013
21 Paul K. Kerr, John Rollins and Catherine A. Theohary, “The Stuxnet Computer Worm: 
Harbinger of an Emerging Warfare Capability,” Congressional Research Service, December 9, 
2010.
22 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
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The new version of Stuxnet was designed to attack the Centrifuge Drive 
System (CDS), targeting the rotor velocities of the centrifuges.23 This version 
of the malware was slightly simpler in its objective: targeting the speed of the 
centrifuges instead of pressure. The new Stuxnet had the ability to not only 
spread via the manual use of USB sticks, but could also self-replicate. As noted 
by Ralph Langner in his technical analysis of Stuxnet, the malware now had 
the power to duplicate itself on machines “within trusted networks and via 
USB sticks even on computers that did not host the engineering software ap-
plication.”24 Suddenly, the malicious code had been updated with an incredibly 
new powerful arsenal. It was now equipped with the, “latest and greatest MS 
Windows exploits and stolen digital certificates.”25 These zero-day exploits are 
undisclosed software vulnerabilities that hackers can utilize to adversely affect 
computer systems.26 Specifically, the exploits allowed the virus to be more 
versatile and lethal, but came at a cost. It was this expansion in hacking vul-
nerabilities and self-replication that made the virus less secure and ultimately 
led to its discovery when Iranian officials noticed random shut downs and 
reboots on their computers.27 Along with these multiple zero-day exploits, the 
malware had many diverse functions that included modifying system libraries, 
attacking Siemens’ SCADA control software, and using rootkits.28 Rootkits are, 
“clandestine computer programs” that allow an unauthorized user to access 
computer systems while going undetected.29 By using rootkits, Stuxnet was 
able to collect information from the SCADA control software, which was 
responsible for visually displaying the physical and functional layout of the 
Natanz nuclear facility on computer screens.30 Accessing the information on 
these SCADA screens was vital to understanding the layout of the facility and 
the industrial processes of the plant. It was this combination of functionalities 
that rendered Stuxnet so unique, effective, and complex. 
23 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
24 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
25 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
26 Kaspersky Lab, “What is a zero day exploit?” USA Kaspersky, 2016, https://usa.kaspersky.
com/internet-security-center/definitions/zero-day-exploit#.WMNLC2QrLR0.
27 Op. Cit., fn. 21.
28 Paul Mueller and Babak Yadegari, “The Stuxnet Worm,” Arizona Computer Science, 
2012.
29 Neil DuPaul, “Rootkit: What is a Rootkit?” Veracode, https://www.veracode.com/
security/rootkit.
30 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
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The virus was purposefully and specifically designed to infiltrate the Step7 
installations within the Siemens’ SCADA control software.31 These Step7 in-
stallations control the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that are necessary 
to control the industrial processes. The Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz used 
this specific software for its industrial operations. Additionally, in order for 
the virus to be successful, it needed to understand the layout and structure of 
the building. Stuxnet’s programming was catered to the layout of the Natanz 
nuclear facility, which was carefully pieced together over the years from insider 
information and the unintentional release of a photograph of former President 
Ahmadinejad during his tour of the facility in 2008.32
The enhanced form of Stuxnet operated periodically, about once a month, 
to avoid detection. The new directive of the cyber weapon was to speed up the 
rotors of the centrifuges which, by function, increases rotor-wall pressure. At 
Natanz, normal centrifuge rotor speeds hovered around 63,000 rpm, but the 
introduction of Stuxnet increased speeds to 84,600 rpm for approximately fifteen 
minutes. Other methods such as deceleration were thought to have been used if 
the initial high velocity speeds did not successfully sabotage all the uranium in 
the centrifuge. The operation is thought to have destroyed approximately 1,000 
of Iran’s 5,000 centrifuges in use and set back the nation’s nuclear program by 
a couple of years.33 This number might have been larger if computer analysts 
had not discovered the code so early on. Regardless, the operation was aimed 
at the long-term. The creators of such a code had the intention of a prolonged, 
slow process of manipulation, rather than a quick, violent destruction of Iran’s 
nuclear capabilities.
As previously mentioned, Stuxnet had some assistance from other software. 
Both Flame and Duqu share striking similarities with Stuxent in their tech-
nical aspects and design.34 Flame is perhaps the largest piece of malware ever 
discovered at six megabytes.35 The intent of this malware was aimed more 
specifically at the collection of data through espionage. Spying activities such 
as activating webcams and microphones and colleting geo-locational data are 
31 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
32 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
33 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
34 Boldizsár Bencsáth, “Duqu, Flame, Gauss: Followers of Stuxnet,” BME CrySyS Lab, 
2012.
35 Ibid.
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just a few of its primary functions.36 Quite similar but with a slight difference 
was the Duqu malware whose function was to collect information regarding 
industrial processes. More specifically, Duqu was a, “reconnaissance tool that 
researchers say was used to copy blueprints of Iran’s nuclear program.”37 Given 
the functions of Flame and Duqu and the overall similarities in structure, 
these programs are thought to have supplemented Stuxnet and assisted in 
its overall operation. 
The Culprits
Much ink has been spilled over who created such a project. While neither the 
United States nor Israel have claimed responsibility for the attack, there is 
sufficient evidence that points toward these two countries. The United States 
has pursued a route of nuclear non-proliferation and containment toward Iran 
for decades.38 The U.S. wishes to deter nuclear powers, especially within the 
volatile Middle East, whilst supporting Israel’s defense and power within the 
region. Furthermore, the complexity and sheer size of Stuxnet led many pro-
fessional software analysts to conclude that only a powerful nation-state could 
have created and conducted such an operation.39 By process of elimination, 
the political motivations and grandeur of the malware point directly toward 
the United States. In Ralph Langner’s “To Kill a Centrifuge,” he argues that 
the operation against Iran was as much a nuclear non-proliferation tactic as 
much as it was a cyber-attack.40 He goes on to say, “it is not even difficult to 
identify potential suspects for such an operation; nuclear non-proliferation 
is the responsibility of the US Department of Energy and since 1994 also of 
the Central Intelligence Agency.”41 His remarks highlight the rational motive 
behind the United States undertaking such an operation. 
In David E. Sanger’s article entitled, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave of 
Cyberattacks Against Iran,” he chronicles a meeting in the White House 
Situation Room following the leak of the virus in which President Obama, 
36 Ibid.
37 Nicole Perlroth, “Researchers Find Clues in Malware,” The New York Times, May 30, 
2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/technology/researchers-link-flame-virus-to-stuxnet-
and-duqu.html.
38 Department of Defense and Department of Energy. September 2008. National Security 
and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.
39 Op. Cit., fn. 21.
40 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
41 Op. Cit., fn. 20.
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Vice President Joe Biden, and former CIA Director Leon E. Panetta discuss 
shutting down the operation.42 Furthermore, Sanger goes on to note that his 
account of the US-Israeli operation to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program 
is, “based on interviews over the past 18 months with current and former 
American, European and Israeli officials involved in the program.”43 Sanger, 
a reputable journalist specializing in covert American programs, chronicles 
detailed information and interviews that exposes the US-Israeli joint effort in 
Operation Olympic Games. The facts and assumptions clearly point toward 
the United States and Israel as the primary culprits behind the masterful 
cyber weapon.
Conclusion
As presented above, it is quite clear United States’ covert cyber operations 
have not only drastically expanded since 9/11, but have done so in an of-
fensive manner. The complexity, sophistication, and grandeur of Stuxnet 
are a testament to the vast expansion and utilization of the United States’ 
cyber arsenal. Furthermore, this repudiates the view that the U.S. is the 
victim in most cyber affairs, simply playing a defensive role in the interest 
of national security. Operation Olympic Games serves as a prime example 
of the proliferation and secrecy of U.S. cyber operations abroad in the wake 
of September 11, 2001. 
The research presented throughout this paper serves to highlight the overall 
growth of the United States cyber arsenal. The offensive cyber-attack against 
Iran’s nuclear facility merely scratches the surface of a larger agenda looming 
deep within the U.S. government. The U.S. has capabilities that stretch far 
beyond defensive measures; so far that in most cases the U.S. is the aggressor, 
instigating the cyber conflict. Since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the United 
States has pursued a path that has resulted in the massive expansion of covert 
cyber operations and the subsequent growth of its industry.
On a broader scale, the use of such cyber operations has profound implica-
tions in the geopolitical realm. The U.S. deployed the first-ever digital weapon 
on Iran, forever altering warfare. The introduction of such a covert, powerful 
weapon has begun to change the methods of warfare and has spawned the 
emergence of the fifth warfighting domain: cyber space. Furthermore, the 
42 Op. Cit., fn. 13.
43 Op. Cit., fn. 13.
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extensive cyber platform currently utilized by the U.S. further concentrates he-
gemonic power within its hands. The scale of the global distribution of power 
continues to shift toward America as the nation demonstrates its strength on 
the global stage. Internationally, U.S. dominance in the cyber realm affects 
the decisions, policies, and security of nations around the globe. The power 
the U.S. exerts in the field of cyberspace has caused nations to implement 
cyber programs of their own. The attack has thus opened the floodgates to 
a digital age of warfare that has no bounds and few restrictions. Finally, the 
capabilities of cyber operations have instigated an ethical war between privacy 
rights and national security that has further contributed to the onslaught of 
unintended consequences. As the realm of cyber warfare expands, so too will 
the danger it poses to society.
